CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.724
8 February 1996

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 February 1996, at 10 a.m.

President: U Aye (Myanmar)

GE.96-60491 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 724th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Algeria, Thailand, the United States of America, Nigeria and Indonesia. Once we have listened to the speakers on the list, I intend to invite the Conference to consider the new requests received from Gabon and the United Arab Emirates for participation in our work as non-members. As usual, these requests have been placed in delegations' pigeon-holes. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, two periods are particularly intense in the CD - the beginning and the end of the session. This year as well, at this initial stage of our proceedings, the rule has been respected. On taking the Chair, you found yourself facing special challenges. You have succeeded to a great extent in taking them up. It is with genuine pleasure that I reiterate my warmest congratulations to you. The Algerian delegation encourages you to continue your efforts. We will continue to provide our full support to you.

I would like to take this opportunity to welcome warmly Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, his deputy Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and all their staff. I would like to thank them very sincerely for the assistance they give us with great professionalism and unfailing dedication.

36 years ago, almost to the day, the first nuclear explosion took place in Algeria. This gives us at least one more reason to see the CTBT concluded and enter into force as soon as possible. The Algerian delegation welcomed with great satisfaction the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the appointment of Ambassador Jaap Ramaker as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and of Ambassadors Berdennikov and Mounir Zahran at the head of Working Groups 1 and 2. The three of them are well known for their experience and their diplomatic skills. We are convinced that under their wise guidance the CTBT negotiations will be successfully concluded within the deadline hoped for by the international community. We would like to congratulate them sincerely and assure them of the full cooperation of the Algerian delegation.

For several decades now the issue of nuclear tests has stirred the international community. We had another opportunity quite recently to appreciate the strength of the feelings generated. Today, in the light of the negotiations which have taken place in the framework of the CD, it can be said that never before have we been so close to the conclusion of a legal instrument which responds to the profound aspirations of mankind, that is, a universal treaty completely banning nuclear tests, a treaty which will be effectively verifiable and which will be a genuine contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

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Since the opening of the negotiations in January 1994, much progress has been made - for which sincere thanks are due to Ambassadors Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico and Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, as well as all those who assisted them. Nevertheless, despite the progress made, much remains to be done, and not much time remains to do it. We have no alternative but to step up the negotiations so that the treaty can be finalized by the deadline set by the United Nations General Assembly. That is the keen desire of the Algerian delegation.

Allow me, at this decisive stage of the negotiations, to take this opportunity to address some important points of the rolling text in a little more detail. With regard to scope, the Algerian delegation has already spoken in favour of a complete ban on all nuclear tests and explosions, in all environments, for ever. No exception should be allowed under any pretext, and that includes nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. No room should be left for the qualitative or quantitative development of nuclear arsenals, vertical or horizontal proliferation. The Algerian delegation has also indicated that everything that can be verified should be irrevocably banned. Conversely, this implies that what cannot be verified should not be referred to for the time being, without being explicitly or implicitly set aside. Our concern is both the credibility of the verification regime and the possibility of improving it as technologies evolve. At this stage in the negotiations we note with interest the increasing support for the "zero option".

With regard to the CTBT organization, my delegation is in favour of an independent organization maintaining certain links with IAEA. The nature of these links, in particular their implementation, should be considered in detail. Under this item, the membership of the Executive Council will merit particular attention. The Algerian delegation has already indicated its position and reiterated it on 1 February 1996 in Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee. That position is based on the following elementary principles: no permanent seats, no veto, no exclusion - we consider that exclusion runs counter to the principles of universality and democracy. So, no exclusion of a State party to the CTBT on any pretext. And finally, respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of States.

The membership of the Executive Council is a question too sensitive to be subject only to the criterion of technical expertise, important as that might be for the proper operation of that body. The political criterion is also important and has its place. Nuclear proliferation is both a global and a regional phenomenon. My delegation considers that every region should enjoy equitable representation. We recognize that a formula should be found to ensure a harmonious balance between technical and political constraints. Once the principles have been set, then and only then will we have a clearer idea concerning the quantified composition of the Executive Council.

I now come to the verification regime, and more specifically the issue of on-site inspections, which, be it recalled, was discussed in the utmost detail during the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. That precedent should serve us as a guide. OSIs are important for the effectiveness and efficiency of the verification regime. However, their relationship with the

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sovereignty of States, which rightly try to protect themselves against abuses, make this a sensitive question. For that reason as well as others, including financial reasons, moderate use should be made of OSIs. They should be authorized exclusively by the CTBT organization and conducted under its supervision alone. Information provided by the international monitoring system will constitute the basis for the decision to be taken by the organization after a preliminary procedure to clarify the situation which has given rise to a request for an OSI.

I will conclude this part of my statement with a few words on entry into force. On this point, the Algerian delegation's principal concern can be summarized in a sentence: The treaty must not be the hostage of any State or group of States. We are aware that a CTBT which is not accepted by at least the five nuclear Powers would remain fragile and its future uncertain. However, the entry into force of the treaty after a given number of accessions or ratifications - 60, for example - is the formula which we prefer. That being the case, we are inclined to think that States which have negotiated the CTBT should undertake to accept it, in order to be consistent and to set an example for the international community.

With the exception of the nuclear test ban Committee, the CD did not establish or re-establish any other ad hoc committee in 1995. This year, it has been decided to give priority to the CTBT, which we fully approve of with the great hope of seeing the negotiations crowned by success in the coming weeks. However, we have not forgotten that other equally important questions are waiting to be taken up by the CD. We have in mind in particular the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We hoped at one point that the extension of the NTP for an indefinite period would promote a breakthrough in this area, which, be it recalled, has been under discussion for two decades now. In fact, the question of security assurances is as old as the NTP itself. Granting security assurances to non-nuclear States would be no more than the counterpart of the decision by those States to renounce voluntarily the possession of nuclear weapons. They too - hardly surprisingly - have a legitimate concern to ensure genuine security for their peoples and safeguard their independence, their territorial integrity and their sovereignty by every means. It must be acknowledged that an appropriate solution has not been found to this major problem so far. The only difference between Security Council resolutions 255 and 984 lies in the simple fact that the latter was accepted by the five nuclear Powers. The security guarantees are neither unconditional, nor uniform, nor legally binding. Resolution 984 falls well short of meeting the expectations of the non-nuclear States. It is of value only if it is considered as the starting-point for the negotiation of a multilateral convention which is legally binding and offers comprehensive and unconditional security assurances. Is that an irrational request when we bear in mind that an intergovernmental conference is considering a ban on anti-personnel mines on the grounds that their use has been denounced as illegal under international law?

The end of the cold war has freed the world from the spectre of nuclear war. Now it must be rid of nuclear weapons. The process conducted by the

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Conference on Disarmament should be aimed at that ultimate objective, which is not utopian and which has been already called for by the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly. Some try to justify the possession and qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear arsenals in terms of a concern to guarantee security for their countries and their peoples. We consider, for our part, that security, like peace, is indivisible. And that instead mankind needs economic and intellectual resources to be devoted to enhancing its well-being. We duly appreciate the efforts made by some nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Russian Federation, to reduce their arsenals of strategic weapons. Those efforts have led, inter alia, to the 1972 anti-missile (ABM) Treaty, START I, whose entry into force has been made possible thanks to Ukraine's accession to the NTP, and START II, the complete ratification of which we hope to see as soon as possible. However, all these efforts, praiseworthy and useful as they are, are characterized by bilateralism and cannot totally replace multilateral negotiations, the appropriate forum for which is incontestably the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament should be made a priority. In this regard, we fully support the G.21 declaration of 23 January 1996. We consider that to ensure serious chances of success, the Conference on Disarmament must adopt a balanced approach in its proceedings.

There is another question to which Algeria attaches great importance. My country is in favour of the immediate opening of serious negotiations in good faith on a convention to ban fissile material destined for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. The convention should be non-discriminatory, universal in scope and effectively verifiable. It must be a contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament. The report presented by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon, constitutes an acceptable basis for launching negotiations.

At its very first ordinary session held in July 1964 in Cairo, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU adopted a declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. This identified one of the main concerns of the leaders of the continent. Today, we note with satisfaction that the Pelindaba Treaty will be opened for signature in Cairo at the beginning of April 1996. The Treaty constitutes an important disarmament measure and contributes to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. It contains three protocols open to some non-African Powers. We hope that they will help to make it effective and thus contribute to strengthening African security. Thanks to the Pelindaba Treaty the total area kept safe from nuclear proliferation around the world is expanding. It might expand even more - in the Middle East, for example, where the peace process has been developing in a positive direction - so that one day the world will be totally rid of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding, I would like to announce that I will soon begin my consultations. I will conduct them within the strict framework of the mandate given me by the CD. I know that my task as Special Coordinator on the agenda will be difficult. I count on the support and the understanding of every

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member of this august assembly. Let me add that I will certainly involve the member States of the G.23, that is, the States on the O'Sullivan list, in these consultations.

This leads me to reiterate the position of my delegation on the question of the expansion of the CD. We strongly support the immediate admission, without conditions and on a basis of equality, of all the States on the O'Sullivan list. We have expressed this position on several occasions. Let me cite our statements before the CD on 2 February 1994, 18 August 1994 and 21 September 1995. This Conference has already made a decision. We hope that it will be implemented as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Thailand, Mr. Maolanon.

Mr. MAOLANON (Thailand): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation takes the floor, may I take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference? I wish also to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Thai delegation, to put on record the Thai Government position on nuclear tests, as follows.

Thailand reaffirms its opposition to all nuclear tests, as they violate the spirit of the NPT and the NPT Review Conference decision in pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In this regard, Thailand strongly urges all nuclear-weapons States to exercise the utmost restraint and a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. Since the French Government made the announcement on 29 January 1996 to end all its nuclear tests in the South Pacific, Thailand hopes that the merit of this action could contribute to the negotiation process of the CTBT and lead to its conclusion as originally planned. Thailand also hopes that France and all nuclear-weapons States will adhere to the CTBT as soon as the treaty is opened for signature. In addition, to strengthen the nuclear disarmament regime, Thailand, together with all the ASEAN countries, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, had already signed a Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone at the ASEAN summit meeting held in Bangkok last December.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Thailand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, last week you asked all CD members a number of questions about the CD's role regarding - and I quote your memo to us - "the question of nuclear disarmament". I responded to you bilaterally, but I think your questions and, I would like to think, my responses are important enough that they should be elaborated on the record.

All countries represented in the Conference on Disarmament agree on the need for discussions on nuclear disarmament which could lead to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear arms. For decades, the American people have supported the United States Government's nuclear disarmament efforts, of which START II ratification is the latest example. The START Treaty is resulting in very deep reductions - nearly 75 per cent - in the nuclear arsenals of the

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Russian Federation and the United States, and removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Entry into force of START II will result in even deeper reductions. Nevertheless, views differ among CD States on where, at what pace, and how best to pursue broader efforts on nuclear disarmament.

The non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference last spring resulted in the indefinite extension of that Treaty, and was an historic accomplishment for all mankind. It is from the NPT and the NPT process that the United States derives its international commitments on nuclear disarmament. The preamble and article VI of the NPT state: "Desiring ... the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (preamble, paragraph 12), "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (article VI). These treaty commitments are also binding on all other nation States in the world, except for those very few - and the current number is nine - who are not parties to the NPT. Several of that small and still diminishing number are members of the CD. That's an important factor to which I will return.

The "Principles and objectives" document for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference last May stated that "the Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty". That document, under the heading of "Nuclear disarmament", states further that "the undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament."

The document continues by pointing out that three measures noted in a "programme of action" are important "in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI". The first item is the completion, by the CD, of comprehensive-test-ban-treaty negotiations no later than 1996. The second item is the immediate commencement and early conclusion, by the CD, of negotiations on a convention on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The third item is "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Please note that the CD was recognized by the NPT parties as being responsible for negotiation of a CTBT and of a fissile material cut-off convention, but the CD was not accorded the same responsibility on efforts to reduce nuclear weapons

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globally. Please also note that the third item details disarmament commitments by both the five nuclear-weapon States and all other parties to the Treaty.

These clear and circumscribed NPT commitments notwithstanding, following our return to Geneva from New York, more emphasis was applied by some in the CD to the general concept of "nuclear disarmament". Linkage was created between getting on with the negotiation of a convention on the cut-off of the production of fissile material, and an issue called "nuclear disarmament", by which its proponents seemed to mean nuclear arms reductions only by the five nuclear-weapon States, but under the supervision of all members of the CD. Various CD members stated a rationale for such linkage; the motives of some were unstated.

The linkage-meisters chose to ignore the specific, concrete aspects of the traditional terminology, and began saying that CTBT and "fizz cut-off" no longer qualified as nuclear disarmament measures. In any case, fissile material cut-off negotiations were stymied, even though the CD had already established for this purpose an ad hoc committee and adopted an appropriate mandate. These negotiations remain blocked to this day. Indeed, it is fashionable this year in the CD to obscure the fact that the Conference agreed in 1994 to negotiate "fizz cut-off" in 1995 but then reneged on its commitment. Those responsible for that reversal owe the rest of us an explanation for their escalated demands.

Also, notwithstanding the language in the NPT Review and Extension Conference "Principles and objectives" document, to the dismay of my Government and many others, the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Cartagena in October called on the Conference on Disarmament "to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations early in 1996 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework". The overwhelming majority of the participants at the NAM summit were NPT adherents; a few were not. This Cartagena non-aligned concept was then included in a United Nations General Assembly resolution which was "adopted" last December but with a large number of abstentions, and 39 "no" votes, including that of the United States.

Since the beginning of the 1996 Conference on Disarmament there have been several national statements calling for negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the CD. These individual statements, together with the G-21 collective statement delivered here by the Ambassador of Peru on 23 January, suggest that the CD has an obligation under the NPT "Principles and objectives" document to negotiate on nuclear arms reductions leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, according to the afore-mentioned non-consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution on this issue. The persistent repetition of this distortion does not, in fact, change the reality of what was actually agreed to in the NPT and the NPT review process, any more than persistent repetition of the desire of NPT parties for NPT universality could impose obligations on those few States which persist in their determination not to assume them.

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The idea of discussing nuclear disarmament and a programme of reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework raises several questions. What does "time-bound framework" mean? Dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons are taking place according to changed political circumstances and the driving force of specific State interests in lessening the nuclear weapons threat.

Let me quickly recount a number of nuclear disarmament examples, which, according to fashion, are conveniently overlooked in this forum: The SALT negotiations between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the 1970s attempted, with some success, to halt the arms race; the INF agreement with the former Soviet Union in the 1980s eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons; the United States-Soviet threshold test-ban Treaty limited the yield of nuclear-test explosions; the recent unilateral assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons (United Nations Security Council resolution 984); the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Antarctic Treaty, and the announced intention by the United States and other nuclear-weapon States to sign this year the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty; United States unilateral measures in the early 1990s to remove thousands of warheads from aircraft and ships; United States and Russian detargeting of thousands of nuclear warheads; unilateral measures by several States to curtail fissile material production; the transfer by the United States of vast stockpiles of such materials irrevocably out of military programmes; and finally the START I and START II treaties. As a result of START I, the United States is removing from deployment thousands of nuclear warheads a year and will ultimately reduce its strategic forces by 9,000 warheads. START II will target another 3,000 warheads for reduction by each party.

How could we be sure that the instituting of a "time-bound framework", dictated by those who bring nothing but pieties and rhetoric to the dialogue, would not be an artificial mechanism affecting adversely the current trend I just described toward deep nuclear weapons reductions? Incidentally, there is also a practical and limiting reality: the maximum capability of the United States to destroy the thousands of nuclear warheads resulting from the START treaties is already totally saturated, and will be well into the twenty-first century. How would a "time-bound framework" apply to this process?

Another question is how negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear arms in a "time-bound framework" would relate to the diverse situations of various States with varied nuclear holdings. As I have said, the Russian Federation and the United States are engaged in bilateral, and quite successful, efforts mutually to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Two other nuclear-weapon States, France and the United Kingdom, have undertaken a number of important unilateral nuclear disarmament steps. Unfortunately, the fifth nuclear-weapon State, China, continues nuclear-weapon testing and the build-up of its nuclear arsenal. Some say the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States with the largest holdings must first be brought down by almost an order of magnitude before they, with smaller holdings, could

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consider reductions themselves. In other words, the five declared nuclear-weapon States are obviously not all ready to respond now to the challenge of multilateral negotiations.

Thus, it seems logical to us that negotiations about reductions would in the natural course of events have to be among the five, initially. Of course, a later role for a larger forum, possibly the CD, could not be ruled out.

There is also the question of whether and how nuclear reductions "in a time-bound framework" would affect certain nuclear-capable or "threshold" States which, unlike NPT States, have no solemn treaty commitments - not even regarding the existence and continuation of their nuclear-weapon programmes, much less in regard to nuclear reductions and non-proliferation. How would this body deal with this ambiguous and tricky issue?

Mr. President, as I told you in our bilateral meeting, I think we have a problem in terminology. My delegation thinks the CD has been doing little else but nuclear disarmament since we completed the chemical weapons Convention in 1992. CTBT and "fizz cut-off" are the first two concrete steps. When those tasks are accomplished and other conditions are propitious, we must ask ourselves: What is the best place to discuss those aspects of nuclear disarmament that will begin to address weapon reductions on a multilateral basis?

We can foresee advantages and disadvantages to possible future use of the CD for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. One question which immediately arises and which we believe would have to be overcome is this: How would we go forward on this important issue in the CD - a body which operates by consensus - when a few of its important members not only are free to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, but do not even have the NPT commitment "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control"?

Happily, negotiations on a CTBT have been progressing and the CD has made notable progress. As the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, pointed out at this year's inaugural CD plenary, the CTBT is both a disarmament and non-proliferation measure. However, recently the ghost of nuclear disarmament linkage has been evoked in connection with CTBT negotiations and threatens to impede progress. Mr. Holum warned that the threat of linking the CTBT to a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons wears a benign face and masquerades as deep devotion to arms control. He added that holding one important goal hostage to another is a sure way to fail at both.

Nuclear disarmament - together with non-proliferation issues - will certainly be discussed at the NPT review conference in 1997 by the vast majority of States who are parties to the Treaty. By that time, we hope that CD participants will be able to report the completion not only of a CTBT but

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also of a convention on the cut-off of production of fissile material, the two goals agreed for the CD by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The United States will also be prepared to report on and discuss its performance, under the Review and Extension Conference mandate, to pursue as a nuclear-weapon State systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. All NPT parties will have the opportunity to report on their efforts to pursue general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

As I told you privately, Mr. President, the United States will be prepared to play an active and constructive role in discussions and negotiations on nuclear disarmament wherever they are agreed to take place. We are willing to talk - without preconditional structures and frameworks - about the common zeal to make progress toward this shared goal. The United States has made great progress in this field in the recent past, and my Government is convinced and determined that we will continue to do so in the future.

We all agree that completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will be a critical move toward the objective of nuclear disarmament. Completion soon thereafter of a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes would be another such important contribution. Let us get on with these tasks now while the window of political opportunity to accomplish them is open. The United States will be right there when all the nations of the world with nuclear-weapon stockpiles and programmes are ready to sit down and negotiate reductions, not on the basis of "Let's just talk about what you should do", but on the basis of "What's mine is also negotiable".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Abuah.

Mr. ABUAH (Nigeria): Mr. President, please accept my warm congratulations for your successful conduct of the affairs of the Conference on Disarmament so far. Your diplomatic skills and untiring efforts contributed to the smooth commencement of the Conference on Disarmament in this challenging year. Equally deserving tribute is your predecessor, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. Ambassador Benjelloun's untiring efforts and seemingly endless hours of consultations contributed, in no small measure, to the ease with which the Conference started its work this year.

I thank you and all our colleagues who have welcomed me to this very important forum. I look forward to cooperating with you and other members of the Conference on Disarmament in advancing the cause of peace and international security.

1995 was, in many respects, an historic year for non-proliferation. It was the year in which the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was made permanent; it was also the year in which African leaders endorsed the African

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). 1995 was also the year in which the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaty was signed. 1996 has a few noteworthy anniversaries. It marks the 50th anniversary of the General Assembly resolution which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That resolution was adopted unanimously. It has been an annual series ritual in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in many other international forums to repeat the call for the elimination of this horrendous and anti-civilization weapon. We could make 1996 memorable or ignominious for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by what we do with the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Since 1946, there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests carried out in the atmosphere, under water or underground. The latest such test was carried out not long ago against the spirit of our time and of current international opinion. We hope that the recent statement announcing the end to these tests will be strictly adhered to. After four decades of persistent calls and two years of serious negotiations, a comprehensive test-ban treaty appears within reach. But serious impediments remain. A major obstacle is the scope of the treaty. Nigeria, in the past, stated that the treaty should cover all nuclear tests in all environments. There should be no exception even for so-called subcritical tests. The scope should be truly comprehensive without leaving room for hydronuclear experiments that may be exploited for designing lightweight nuclear bombs.

A second major obstacle relates to verification, particularly on-site inspection (OSI). OSI is sensitive and contentious. A careful balance has to be struck between the need to monitor vigorously treaty implementation, which Nigeria supports, and intrusive on-site inspection that might go beyond monitoring compliance with the treaty. Nigeria believes OSI should be rare, least intrusive and timely. It should be triggered by data from the international monitoring system after appropriate opportunity must have been given for consultation and clarification. Early agreement on these vital issues is necessary if the treaty is to be concluded by "early 1996".

Besides the scope of the treaty and certain aspects of its verification mechanism, there are problems in many other areas. Issues such as funding, the composition of the Executive Council and entry into force would need early agreement also. Differences in these areas constitute over 1,300 brackets chaining the draft treaty. Given such a large number of brackets, the Conference needs the discipline, the hard work and, most important, the political will to bring the treaty into early fruition. The question is: are we genuinely committed to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament to bring into existence a CTBT that can curb vertical as well as horizontal proliferation?

A CTBT that contains strong disarmament language will be a significant step towards establishing a nuclear disarmament regime. Such a regime can be achieved within the framework of a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament. Nigeria had indeed advocated such a framework in the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April/May 1995. Nigeria believes that the

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Conference on Disarmament is uniquely placed to discuss such a programme of nuclear disarmament in the context of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament which should be established early this year.

We are not unmindful of the thesis, hardly credible as there are empirical data to disprove it, that nuclear weapons provide stability and maintain peace. It has further been argued that the deterrence supposedly offered by nuclear weapons has prevented wars and, that, consequently, a world without nuclear weapons would indeed be an unstable and dangerous world. This is unfortunately a self-serving argument to justify the holding of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have neither prevented wars nor have they guaranteed victory in wars involving nuclear-weapons States. Nuclear-weapon States have been directly involved in four conflicts in which they have not prevailed. With the permanence of the NPT, the end of the cold war and disarmament in the other areas of weapons of mass destruction, the time is ripe to begin discussing a programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We recognize that important bilateral steps have been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks process to reduce their nuclear warheads. The Nigerian Government had welcomed these steps and considered the actions as encouraging. But the pace of nuclear disarmament has to be accelerated and other nuclear-weapon States have to join the process. The end result of the process should be a universally negotiated treaty that will ban the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty will be the third leg, a sturdy leg at that, in the non-proliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament had only one item on its agenda in 1995, namely the nuclear test ban. 1996 should be a different year. We should, as stated earlier, summon the necessary political will to conclude the CTBT by the middle of the year so as to begin work on other important issues such as nuclear disarmament; security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; the cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At a minimum, ad hoc committees should be established or reestablished on these subjects as fitting each case. Failure to agree to the establishment of ad hoc committees on these subjects will stain the success that may arise from the conclusion of the CTBT this year.

The expansion issue should also be fully resolved. Those members admitted in principle through our decision of September 1995, contained in CD/1356, must be enabled to take their seats in the CD immediately.

The challenge before the Conference on Disarmament in 1996 is enormous. We need courage, transparency and flexibility to meet the challenge. The Conference can make the difference between security for a few nations and peoples and security for all humanity irrespective of nation, race and State

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I should like now to give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, at the outset, please allow me to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, the representative of Myanmar, a country with which Indonesia historically enjoys warm and close relations, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1996 session. It is widely recognized that the early stage of the Conference's annual session is always very difficult. But, knowing your personal qualities and with the able leadership which you have demonstrated in guiding us to the speedy re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, I am fully confident that the question of establishing the other subsidiary bodies, especially the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, will soon be resolved. To this end, my delegation pledges its full cooperation in helping you to discharge your demanding tasks. I should also like to use this occasion to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, for the excellent manner with which he conducted our previous work.

I am also pleased to welcome our newly arrived colleagues, the distinguished Ambassadors of Cuba, Kenya and Nigeria, representing countries with which Indonesia also enjoys outstanding relations. We trust that they will bring with them fresh ideas that will be most beneficial in revamping even further the work and productivity of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before addressing the ongoing negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) let me first say a few words on nuclear disarmament. For decades, together with other peace-loving countries, Indonesia has been consistently pressing for the annihilation of nuclear weapons, taking into account the devastating effects they may cause to human beings and their living environment. Putting aside the historical background which triggered the Pacific War, Hiroshima and Nagasaki will continue to serve as a living testimony of the abhorrence of these weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it is because of these chilling experiences that Indonesia is determined to help ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world's arsenal. It is also against this backdrop that my delegation sees the need to address urgently the issue of nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, as clearly stipulated in the G-21's statement, delivered by the distinguished Ambassador Urrutia of Peru, Coordinator of the Group, during the first plenary session.

At regional level, together with the other ASEAN countries, Indonesia has been relentlessly working to make our region a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The conducive international political climate in this post-cold-war era has made our determination even stronger, and after going through intensive negotiations, the member countries of ASEAN - comprising Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam - and the other south-East Asian countries, namely the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Union of Myanmar, have been able to complete and sign the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 December 1995. In due course, my delegation will submit this Treaty as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

Permit me now to touch upon the most important task with which the Conference is confronted, namely that of negotiating and concluding the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). In this respect, let me start by saying that Indonesia is fully committed to the decision adopted by the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference which, inter alia, urges the States parties to conclude the treaty by no later than 1996. The agreement to conclude the CTBT in 1996 should not, however, compromise the true objective we are aiming for, which is a genuinely comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this context, and as my delegation has indicated on a number of occasions, I am happy to state that Indonesia can support the draft article on scope contained in working paper CD/NTB/WP.222, dated 9 March 1995, presented by Australia, which from the Indonesian perspective will ban all types of nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

Unlike those who perceive the CTBT as a mere non-proliferation measure, Indonesia has, from the very beginning, held the view - and will continue to do so - that this treaty should also function in such a way as to cap totally both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the first step towards their complete elimination from the world's arsenal. If the scope of the CTBT still allows the nuclear-weapons States to continue working on their nuclear-weapons programmes, for whatever purposes, this will merely create another non-proliferation regime, while totally contradicting the new realities of the post-cold-war era. It will once again perpetuate the divisions created by the NPT, which distinguishes between "the haves" and "the have-nots" among the States parties, the legacy of which has been preventing the Treaty from achieving its universality.

Hence, we should properly address this matter and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, since declining to do so will, I am afraid, render it difficult to make the CTBT universal. In other words, this treaty should have a twofold objective: first, to prevent all States from proliferating nuclear weapons; and secondly, to deter the nuclear-weapons States and other States with a nuclear capability from producing or designing new nuclear weapons. It is our firm belief that only a true-zero-yield CTBT, which forswears all nuclear explosions, can make this possible and therefore it is the least that Indonesia can entertain.

In this context, it is encouraging to note that the United States Administration holds the same opinion, as President Clinton made clear in one part of his message to the Conference which was read by Mr. John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: "A comprehensive test-ban treaty is vital to constrain both the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. And it will help fulfil our mutual pledges to renounce the nuclear arms race and move toward our ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear arms." My delegation sincerely hopes that the United States Administration will stand firm in its decision and match its international obligations by totally halting all activities which may run counter to this stated policy. We further hope that the remaining

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

nuclear-weapon States will uphold the same principle, thereby guaranteeing that the future CTBT is a genuine step towards the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Another important issue on which a complete meeting of minds of the participating States in the Conference on Disarmament needs to be achieved rather soon - in an attempt to accomplish the task within the agreed time-frame - is "on-site inspection" (OSI). We are somewhat concerned over the protracted debate on how to proceed with a request for an OSI launched by a State party. Being a country which does not possess nuclear weapons and harbours no ambitions to acquire or produce any, I wish to state that Indonesia is flexible as to whether or not such a request should follow the "red light" or "green light" procedure. From our viewpoint, there are two important points to be borne in mind as far as OSI is concerned. First, the CTBT organization should be able, in a timely fashion, to determine whether an ambiguous or suspicious event is in fact a nuclear explosion in violation of the object and purpose of the treaty. Secondly, an OSI should be based on sufficient technical data gathered by the international monitoring system (IMS) to prevent a State party from instigating a baseless or abusive request for an OSI. In view of the likely political costs to the country concerned, the procedures which an OSI request should follow must be designed in such a way as to thwart any attempt by a State party to the future CTBT to launch an abusive request for an OSI. In this regard, I am gratified to learn that all participating States in the Conference on Disarmament have tentatively agreed that such an act is punishable under the treaty, an idea which was first brought to the attention of the Conference by my own delegation.

In our opinion, the funding of the IMS is another critical point that has to be addressed thoroughly. For without an adequate network of monitoring stations, the CTBT will not be able to verify the implementation of the treaty to the maximum possible extent. In this regard, my delegation commends the report of the Expert Group on IMS, as contained in document CD/NTB/WP.283, in which it has recently been able to identify and recommend lists of auxiliary seismic stations, hydroacoustic stations, infrasound stations and radionuclide stations to be included in the IMS, thus complementing the primary stations listed in the rolling text.

Unfortunately, Indonesia has not been able to participate in the work of this Expert Group which was held last December. However, we have made a preliminary study of the report and sent it to our authorities in the capital for further examination. At this point in time, I wish to underline the conclusion of the Expert Group that participation in the IMS is dependent upon the willingness of the host country. From our perspective, in order to encourage the participation of all States, we must devise a system in the treaty which will guarantee the widest participation in the network of monitoring stations, such as, for example, agreeing to the principle that the CTBT organization should at least pay for the establishment of new stations and upgrade the existing ones to match the technical requirements as specified in the treaty. Penalizing the host countries, especially those from

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

developing countries, simply for their strategic geographical locations will be incomprehensible and could undermine the effectiveness of the CTBT when it enters into force.

Allow me also to touch briefly upon an issue which has been on our agenda for years and to which an urgent solution needs to be found, namely, the expansion of the Conference membership. My delegation is very disappointed that the decision adopted by the Conference - thanks to the tireless efforts of Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi - to expand the membership of the Conference to allow another 23 countries to participate as full members cannot be implemented for reasons which we fail to understand. Despite the tremendous efforts made to finalize the decision, in practical terms, no breakthrough has really been achieved and we are still not far enough from the solution offered by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia back in 1993.

In an attempt to overcome the impasse, let me now humbly propose to this august body to take the decision, during this plenary session, to admit all members of the Group of 23 as full members of the Conference on Disarmament and, at a later stage, to reconsider the possibility of admitting the other States who aspire to membership of the Conference. As to the proposed criteria, or any other criteria, to be considered in order to allow countries to participate in the Conference as full members, my delegation would venture to suggest that they should be discussed within the framework of refining the rules of procedure of the Conference. In any case, the Conference's rules of procedure need to be refined in order to meet the new realities of the post-cold-war era.

Taking into account the fact that we have already determined to make 1996 the year of CTBT, let me conclude my statement by appealing strongly to all States participating in the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament to redouble their efforts and to demonstrate their political will to conclude the CTBT within the agreed time-frame. In this ever-changing world, we cannot afford not to make the best of the prevailing momentum and seize the existing golden opportunity offered to us of concluding this treaty. For, failing to achieve such an objective could dampen the will of the global community to get rid of nuclear testing as a first step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control, to which we have been aspiring for decades.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the Chair. Distinguished delegates, I would like to invite your attention to the proposal just made by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, which has been circulated to you. Specifically, I refer to the last paragraph in which he mentions that:

> "In an attempt to overcome the impasse, let me now humbly propose to this august body to take the decision, during this plenary session, to admit all members of the Group of 23 as full members of the Conference on Disarmament and, at a later stage, to reconsider the possibility of admitting the other States who aspire to membership of the Conference.

(The President)

> As to the proposed criteria, or any other criteria, to be considered in order to allow countries to participate in the Conference as full members, my delegation would venture to suggest that they should be discussed within the framework of refining the rules of procedure of the Conference. In any case, the Conference's rules of procedure need to be refined in order to meet the new realities of the post-cold-war era."

I would also like to invite the attention of the Conference to the rules of procedure that we have for the CD and, specifically, to Section VIII, "Agenda and programme of work", paragraph 30. And for those who do not have the rules of procedure readily before them, I shall read out paragraph 30 for you.

> "The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any member State of the Conference to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention."

To guide us further in our deliberations, we have several documents before us already on this particular topic of expansion and, specifically again, I invite the attention of the Conference to document No. CD/1362 of 22 September 1995, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America. We also have before us document CD/1356 of 21 September 1995, and that is the decision on expansion of membership of the Conference, which was adopted at the 719th plenary meeting on 21 September 1995.

And lastly, we have CD/1379 of 23 January 1996, and that is concerning the agenda for the 1996 session, which was adopted at the 721st plenary meeting on 23 January 1996, which mentions inter alia that the Conference in accordance with its decision on expansion of membership contained in document CD/1356 will keep the early implementation of that decision under constant review.

Having said this, I would like to now open the floor for deliberation on the specific proposal for expansion as contained in the statement just made by Ambassador Tarmidzi. I have already on my list of speakers for this topic several delegations, and I shall now give the floor to the first delegation, the representative of Finland.

Mr. EKBLOM (Finland): Mr. President, since this is the first time I attend the plenary under your guidance, I wish to start by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference.

I should like to comment on the statement made just now by Ambassador Tarmidzi, the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, or, rather, the last part of the statement that dealt with the expansion of the Conference membership. This is an urgent issue. We welcome the support of Indonesia, as

(Mr. Ekblom, Finland)

also Algeria and Nigeria, for trying to find an immediate solution that would allow for the implementation of paragraph 2 of decision CD/1356 taken by the Conference on 21 September 1995.

Our understanding is that the September decision did not establish separate categories of membership. Once the September decision is implemented, the membership would be the same for all. We agree with Ambassador Tarmidzi that any overall criteria regarding the right of participation in the decision-making of the Conference would have to be agreed upon within the framework of the review of the rules of procedure of the Conference. The question, then is: Is it possible within this framework to address the one single problem in such a way that a consensus on the implementation of paragraph 2 of decision CD/1356 would be possible? We believe that it is possible if there is the will to do it and if everyone - the 37 members as well as the 23 incoming members - are ready to show flexibility.

Since last September, we have heard various alternatives mentioned as possible approaches to moving forward. These include at least the following:

First, a solution of the type proposed by the United States of America in CD/1362 which would effectively mean that one country, while assuming membership together with others, could not exercise the right of denying consensus on any decision.

Second, a clean decision on the implementation of the September decision, perhaps with accompanying national statements related to concerns of individual countries.

Third, a clean decision on the implementation of the September decision with an accompanying statement by the President, recognizing the fact that there is a unique problem that needs to be addressed but without, in that context, restricting the right to participate in decision-making.

Fourth, a unilateral declaration by one country among the 23 incoming members confirming that it would not for the time being exercise the right of denying alone consensus on any CD decision. Such a declaration could be duly registered by the Conference in the context of taking the decision on the implementation of the expansion.

Fifth, a declaration by all the 23 countries to the effect that none of them would, alone, deny consensus on any CD decision. This type of declaration could also be duly registered by the Conference, without affecting the rules of procedure of the Conference or the future review of them.

We believe that one or several of such approaches should be explored and it should happen now. As agreed last September, the President of the Conference is expected to report on progress in this matter at the end of this ongoing first round of the 1996 session. We believe that, at this stage, the expansion issue should be taken up under the leadership of the President of the Conference, in the first instance under your leadership, Mr. President.

(Mr. Ekblom, Finland)

We support the proposal to address the question today, or if this is not possible, within the next few days. If necessary, an informal plenary could be organized to address this issue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I shall now give the floor to the representative of Chile.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): In keeping with your invitation and your very precise stipulations, Mr. President, I wish to endorse the very timely statement made by my distinguished friend Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia concerning the need to implement decision CD/1356 promptly, the reform of the rules of procedure and your appeal to complete within the allotted time the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which has been the subject of further far-reaching discussion. I would also like to thank the Ambassadors of Algeria and Nigeria for their support for expansion. The three issues are closely interconnected and the annual resolutions of the General Assembly have placed emphasis on more representative participation in the negotiation of the aforementioned convention and other agreements that require universal accession. Concerning expansion, there is a fundamental need for consistency which takes the form of setting the admission of the new members in the two phases proposed by the Ambassador of Indonesia, and an absolute need to have political will on the part of all those involved. Like the representative of Finland, I think that the solution is within our reach in the framework of a list of possibilities that could be explored, as he pointed out, in a special informal plenary.

Our rules of procedure were adopted in the light of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly, and it was an agreement that arose out of the consultations which were held on that occasion and which the General Assembly endorsed in its Final Document. The time has come to reflect more appropriately, in full harmony with the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new state of affairs in world disarmament. It is necessary to highlight even further the function of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole global multilateral negotiating forum, and to delete, for instance, the archaic reference to the nuclear-weapon States. Without affecting the golden rule of consensus in the slightest, the thresholds of participation by member and non-member States could be formulated in more practical terms, having in view in particular the widest possible support for the negotiations on the CTBT. In your consultations, Mr. President, Ambassador Tarmidzi's statement should be given priority consideration, both in the arrangements for implementing decision CD/1356, in the procedure governing the subsequent phase of expansion and in the start of work on redrafting the rules of procedure, which should reflect the principle affirmed in paragraph 28 of the above-mentioned Final Document and the idea set forth in paragraph 120 and taken up in rule 2 of the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, which unfortunately have remained a dead letter for so many years.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement. I shall now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): Mr. President, since it's the first time I'm speaking here this year, may I first congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency and offer you the full cooperation of my delegation? May I also congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, for his most active and constructive work as President?

I too am taking the floor to congratulate my friend, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, for his comprehensive statement and, in particular, to offer New Zealand's support for his proposal to resolve the expansion question. That question has also been referred to this morning by the Ambassadors of Algeria and Nigeria, whom I thank for their statements of support.

Indonesia's proposal has the merit of addressing the three principal aspects to this question. First, there is the need to bring about now the implementation of CD decision CD/1356 as a matter of urgency, as called for by the General Assembly. Secondly, there is the question of the nature of participation in the Conference by full members in light of the proposal put to the Conference at the same time as the adoption of CD/1356. And thirdly, there is the question of future expansions and the aspirations of countries beyond the G-23 to participate in the Conference's work.

Ambassador Tarmidzi has proposed that the questions of participation and of future expansions beyond CD/1356 be considered in an exercise to review the existing rules of procedure. There is no doubt in New Zealand's mind that the rules of procedure must help, and must not hinder, the Conference to achieve its objectives on behalf of the international community. Accordingly, we would be willing to contribute to such a review with the aim of achieving a more representative membership and of consolidating the CD's status as the international community's sole forum for the negotiation of disarmament and arms control treaties. We would therefore like to encourage you, Mr. President, and members of the Conference to take full account of, and to give support to, the Indonesian proposal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States fully sympathizes with the motivation behind Ambassador Tarmidzi's initiative as regards membership expansion and, indeed, he may be on to something. However, I would like to call attention to the fact that the United States made a proposal on 22 September which was referred to earlier, CD/1362, about this subject. It was under the presidency of your predecessor, Mr. President, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi, and he said at that time, as I recall, that he would postpone action on it until he had a sense that it had a pretty good chance of moving forward. I'm afraid I would have to ask that before we return to Ambassador Tarmidzi's proposal, mine would have to be addressed. I have the sense that it might just work. But if not, and getting back to the Indonesian initiative, I would like to recall that the previous year we made

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

another proposal that, as Ambassador Tarmidzi points out, would accomplish the objective, namely, modification of the rules of procedure. Now you could take rule No. 3, which, for those of you who don't have the rules in front of you, reads: "All member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations", and make an amendment to that. Or you could take rule No. 18, which states: "The Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus." Either one could be slightly modified to put into it the thought that is in the United States proposal in CD/1362, namely, to make the exception that no State which is subject to comprehensive enforcement measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter would have the right to deny consensus on any decision to be adopted by the Conference. Now, I have exact language for modification to rule 3. Also exact language for modification to rule 18. Either one would work. But those would have to be adopted before we could have consensus on the simple proposition of the second decision in CD/1356.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I would now have to say that the Conference, I believe, is not in a position as yet, at this moment, to discuss further on the rules of procedure. As for the proposal made by the representative of the United States of America regarding the document that he and I read out (CD/1362 of 22 September 1995), are there any delegations who wish to take the floor on this specific document? Morocco, you have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I would like to say a few words concerning the question of expansion of the membership of the Conference. At the inaugural meeting I had an opportunity to say a little of what I thought concerning the substance of the issue, and consequently I shall not repeat myself. I merely wish to note that we discussed this matter yesterday in the Presidential consultations, and my feeling was that we should not create bad precedents and raise matters in plenary without preparation, because this could lead to deadlock much more than progress, and I must tell you in all honesty, this question was raised in the Presidential consultations which you organized yesterday, Sir, and in which I had the honour of participating, and I believe, and I must be candid with you, as I always am with this Conference, that it was not useful to raise this question, because we knew the response was not positive. Frankly, I ask myself: who are we trying to fool - ourselves? It is not useful to raise these issues when we know the response beforehand. A good negotiator is one who knows in advance the result he wishes to achieve. Today, the response was certain to be negative. I would like to thank all those who participated in this discussion for their constructive spirit and sense of compromise, because this is a difficult issue and we are all here in order to try to resolve it. I believe that in the future we should confine ourselves to our discussions in order to try to resolve this issue, like all other issues, and not try to pull stunts, because that is not the objective we are seeking. I am sorry to say this. Naturally I am in favour of expansion; I have already said that I wish to work on this issue as head of my delegation, so that the decision we took last

(Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi, Morocco)

September can be implemented as soon as possible, today or next week, but I do not think this type of exercise will take us forward on this issue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco for his very helpful statement and I trust that the statement will be taken seriously by all of us in the CD. But I would hasten to add that during the Presidential consultations yesterday afternoon, this matter did not come up and it arrived at a rather late hour. That is why it was not possible for me to mention this at the Presidential consultations. Having said that, I have two more speakers on my list. I should now like to give the floor to the first speaker, the representative of Ukraine.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, since I too am speaking for the first time at this session, I should like to congratulate you on your appointment, to wish you every success and in particular to note your great personal contribution at the very beginning of the session, which enabled us to make a small, symbolic, but nevertheless concrete step in the proper direction in connection with the problem of expanding the Conference's membership. At the same time it is obvious that in order to ensure full implementation of decision 1356 adopted by the Conference at its last session, there is a need for additional, significantly more serious efforts, and especially genuine political will on the part of all member States of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly as we are entering the concluding stage on the nuclear-test-ban treaty, which is to be universal in nature and universally applicable. In this connection I support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Indonesia and a number of other delegations. Our delegation is prepared to work towards its early implementation, taking into account, of course, all the proposals made to date on this matter, inter alia through the convening of a special plenary meeting at the appropriate time. I would simply like to stress that to ensure the success of this work the main requirement is constructive participation in this activity by all States concerned, and I hope that everyone in this room is really interested in a successful solution to this problem. It is also important that this solution should be found urgently before the end of the first stage of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conclusion, I would like to echo other colleagues in stressing the urgency of settling this question and the importance of a positive solution of the matter for the whole of the future work of the Conference and its successful outcome.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and I shall now give the floor to the last speaker on this issue, the representative of Cuba.

Mr. CABALLERO (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We will leave the customary words of welcome and gratitude for our main statement in plenary. We wish to be very specific. My delegation wishes to reiterate that Cuba is among those countries which would like the decision to be taken today, as proposed by our colleague from Indonesia, for the entry of the Group of 23 into the Conference. We fully understand what our colleague from Morocco

(Mr. Caballero, Cuba)

has just stated about the process that we should follow to ensure that the consultations can be brought before the Conference with at least a certain degree of assurance of adoption by consensus. However, we think that the proposal brought to us this morning by our colleague from Indonesia, which unfortunately was unable to produce the desired results, that is to say the approval today, without any type of restriction, of the entry of the Group of 23 into this Conference, at least has a merit which is extremely important for my delegation and this merit is that, before a plenary meeting of the Conference, we have heard yet again where the difficulties lie and who is responsible for the fact that this matter is not culminating in the solution that we all wish for, and I think all this is most appropriate, because in recent days rumours have been circulating which even held the Group of 21 responsible for the fact that at this stage it has not been possible to take the decision.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and, as I have mentioned, that was the last speaker, but I shall make one exception, and this will be the last speaker. I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): I will be very brief. My delegation wholeheartedly supports what the Indonesian Ambassador suggested on the question of CD membership. My delegation, on several occasions, expressed our opinion on the necessity of expansion of the CD but at this time it is not necessary to repeat it. My delegation is also thankful to the Algerian and Nigerian Ambassadors for expressing their deep concern on the same issue. My delegation sincerely hopes that this question can be solved with a spirit of compromise among CD member States.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement. Before giving the floor to the representative of Egypt, I shall look around this room and see if there are any other speakers who wish to take the floor. Mexico shall be the very last speaker - and this is a ruling by the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): In fact the Egyptian delegation was surprised that this question has been raised during this meeting. Normally there is enough transparency in the work of the Conference on Disarmament to enable us to know in advance what is going to be considered. However, the matter that was raised by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, is not a new one and our position is quite clear. We have clarified our position several times, most recently on 21 September 1995, when the Conference adopted the resolution contained in document CD/1356, when we said that we supported the immediate admission of the 23 States on the O'Sullivan list, without conditions and on a footing of equality. Let me now just reiterate that position once again. As regards the decision that was made, we agreed with it at the time in order not to go against the consensus. The position of the Egyptian delegation, as it has repeatedly stated, is for the immediate admission of the 23 States without conditions and on a footing of equality. If what is now being proposed is an amendment to one of the rules of procedure, that is a new matter and we shall

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

therefore have to have consultations to see how that provision should be amended and how we can reach a consensus on an agreed wording before this matter is raised in a plenary meeting.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for reiterating what I had just mentioned, that the time is not opportune for us to talk about any amendments to the rules of procedure. Having said that, I shall give the floor to the very last speaker, the representative of Mexico, and I shall accept no other speakers after the representative of Mexico. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the dubious honour of being the last to speak in this debate, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank you also for the efforts you have been making very successfully, because since the beginning of your term, the beginning of this session, we have succeeded in getting work on the CTBT under way. It is true that three weeks have passed, and at this stage it would seem that in these three weeks the only thing we have achieved is to increase the number of brackets in the rolling text, but I hope that matters will improve, especially if we are not distracted by other issues which, while no less important, are perhaps not as well-timed as one might wish.

I should like to thank the Permanent Representative of Indonesia for the proposed decision which he tabled today, and to announce that my delegation is fully prepared to agree to our adopting this decision, and we will have no problem in accepting it in the terms set out by the representative of Indonesia. My country supports the immediate implementation of decision CD/1356 of 21 September 1995. As for the proposal that the rules of procedure should be revised, my delegation has no objection, on the understanding that we will insist, as we have always done, that all rules should be general in nature, applicable to all, and not ad hominem provisions which are not general in nature and can have no legal value.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. I shall now sum up and conclude.

Among us seated in this room there is no other person who would like to have a decision on the matter of expansion more than the President because, as of now, this heavy responsibility falls on my shoulders. But we have to go according to the guidance, the decisions that we had taken earlier on this matter, the deliberations that we had intensively conducted over the months on this issue. We spoke so much about the rules of procedure, and I would like to point out once more that in the rules of procedure we have section VI, "Conduct of work and adoption of decisions". I shall quote paragraph 18: "The Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus." It is amply clear to all of us gathered here, from the deliberations we have had today on the specific issue of expansion, that the matter as yet, at this particular stage, does not enjoy consensus, and hence I shall not be able to make a ruling on this, other than to say that I shall continue my intensive

(The President)

consultations on the matter of expansion, among others, and I shall make a report to the next plenary, the last under my presidency. Having said that, I close the deliberations on this particular item.

My list of speakers for today is exhausted. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage, on any issue other than expansion? The representative of China has asked for the floor. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): In accordance with your ruling, I will not mention the question of expansion.

The distinguished Ambassador of the United States mentioned just now the issue of China's nuclear testing. As I said some time ago, had it been the non-nuclear-weapon States expressing their concern over China's nuclear testing, it would have been understandable. The case, however, is different for the United States. As is known to all, it is the United States that possesses today the largest and the most advanced nuclear arsenal in the world. It is the United States that will still possess the largest and the most advanced nuclear arsenal even after its implementation of the START II treaty in 2003. And it is the United States that for all the past decades has stuck to its policy of nuclear deterrence based on its first use of nuclear weapons against any other country. Owing to these reasons, the United States is not qualified to point its finger at China's extremely limited number of nuclear tests. Let us recap briefly the past history. The international community has long demanded the cessation of all nuclear tests since the 1950s. To achieve this objective, numerous resolutions have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Why then was the Conference on Disarmament able to establish the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee and start negotiations on the CTBT only a little more than two years ago? How many nuclear tests were conducted by the United States during these decades? For all these years, whenever the United States chose to test, it would not allow test-ban negotiations. And now, when the negotiations have started, the United States is demanding that all other countries should follow the American approach and timetable and is making irresponsible comments on the extremely limited number of nuclear tests of others. What kind of logic is this!

I wish to reiterate here today that the completion of the CTBT as soon as possible and not later than 1996 has always been a goal which the Chinese delegation has striven for. Naturally, the Chinese delegation wishes to speed up the negotiations. At the same time, the Chinese delegation also wishes to conclude a good CTBT that is acceptable to all parties so as to achieve the early entry into force of the treaty. Proceeding from this position, the Chinese delegation has all along objected to the opportunist attitude of political expediency toward the CTBT negotiations and has opposed the imposition of certain domestic political factors of a few countries onto the multilateral treaty negotiations. I must state once again that China has conducted only a limited number of nuclear tests and has exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing. China has never intended to continue nuclear testing indefinitely, nor will it do so. Once the CTBT enters into force, China will cease all nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the People's Republic of China for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This is not the case, so I shall proceed further.

I should now like to take up the new requests for participation in the work of the Conference during this year. Requests were received from Gabon and the United Arab Emirates. They are before you under a covering note by the President in document CD/WP.472. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite Gabon and the United Arab Emirates to participate as non-members in the work of the Conference, without having to convene an informal meeting for this purpose, on the understanding that this would not constitute a precedent for future similar requests?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As you are aware, intensive consultations are still under way, both at the bilateral and group levels, with a view to developing a basis for consensus on how to deal with the issue of nuclear disarmament in the Conference, as well as on the implementation of the decision taken by the Conference last September (CD/1356) on expansion of membership. These consultations will continue, and it is my intention to present a report on their outcome at the next plenary meeting which, as I have said, will be the last under my presidency.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings for next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, only indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I assume that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 February 1996 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.